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1. Introduction 
The recent public and academic debate on migration has increasingly focused on the ‘mobility 
transition’ hypothesis, which states that emigration rises during the first stages of development of 
countries and decreases afterwards. To it is related the prediction the immigration in Western countries 
will continue to grow as low-income countries develop. Despite the hypothesis lacks a strong empirical 
support, it tends to be widely accepted as a stylized fact (Clemens and Sandefur, 2015). 
 Some empirical studies using cross-sectional data that take income as a proxy of development 
find a bell-shaped relationship between income and emigration (a review is in Clemens, 2014), but the 
relationship fades in other investigations, based on different samples, econometric specifications or 
covariates (Hatton and Williamson, 2005; Lucas, 2006; Mayda 2010; Ortega and Peri, 2013; Hanson 
and McIntosh; 2016 Dao et al. 2018a). Overall, the results reached in these studies appear to be strongly 
related to the ways in which the links between emigration and development are defined and measured. 
Hence, starting from these approaches, this paper uses a wide dataset and different specifications to 
shed light on the links between emigration and development by. It aims at proving a unified and robust 
framework on this topic, which has important implications both for developing countries, rich 
economies and international policies. 
During the second part of last century, the search of potential links between development and 
emigration was mostly based on the then scarce available data regarding demographic movements 
within or between countries. A frequently cited author, Zelinsky (1971), observed that internal and 
international migration appeared to increase during the early stages of development, to pause at mid-
levels and decrease afterwards. He linked this bell-shaped relationship to a demographic mobility 
transition: the modernization of economies and societies initially was followed by increased birth rates 
and lower mortality, but after a certain stage of development, birth rates started to decrease, and the 
decrease was more rapid than the fall in mortality. Later, Hatton and Williamson (1994) also explained 
mass emigration from Europe with development and population changes in the home countries. In this 
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interpretation, the relationship between emigration and development was mainly driven by 
demography and education: industrialization led to population growth, which glutted labour markets 
and boosted geographical mobility, but industrialization also implied improvements in education, 
which had negative effects on birth rates. Then, lower population growth rates and the improved 
economic conditions at home associated with industrialization weakened the incentives to emigrate.  
In more recent times, the transition mobility hypothesis is interpreted as a direct relationship 
between emigration and income rather than between emigration and the composite phenomenon of 
development, of which income is one but not the only component.  In this interpretation, it is assumed 
that higher income in poor countries allows previously resource-constrained individuals to afford the 
costs of moving abroad, and therefore boosts emigration (a comprehensive review is in Clemens, 
2014). However, a weakness of this assumption is that while it can justify the upward sloping part of 
an inverted-U path relating emigration and income, it does not provide an explanation for the peak and 
subsequent downward-sloping parts. Moreover, it omits the other potential effect of higher income at 
home, which is that it is for individuals an important reason to remain. This second potential 
consequence of income growth, together with the nonlinear effects of the other forces of development, 
may help to explain why the mobility transition hypothesis is not robustly supported by the empirical 
evidence. 
This paper uses a dataset comprising emigration from 130 developing countries from 1991 to 
2015. Following Zelinsky (1971), Hatton and Williamson (1994) and other studies, income, education, 
demography and their interactions are taken as indicators of countries’ development levels. 
Preliminary, non-parametric tests show that emigration from countries having the same levels of 
income can follow entirely different and even opposite paths. In further, semi-parametric and 
parametric regressions, comprising education, population growth and several control variables, I find 
the relationship between emigration and income to be U-shaped from low to middle income levels, 
and to become bell-shaped only at higher levels of income. However, only the initial, descending part, 
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is robust to all specifications. Moreover, the relationship between emigration and income shifts with 
countries’ education levels and population growth rates. The minimum turning points of the initial U-
shaped paths occur at per capita income levels ranging from 1,400 $US (here and hereafter, US$ 
constant 2011) – in coincidence with low education and rapid population growth –  to 2,200$US – 
with higher education and lower population growth –. Similarly, maximum turning points occur at 
income levels ranging from 10,400$ to 22,000$. Furthermore, I find that migration to developed 
economies increases from countries at middle levels of development. The rest of the paper is structured 
as follows. Section 2 summarizes previous studies; Section 3 presents the data and some initial results; 
Section 4 presents and discusses estimations findings; Section 5 focuses on emigration to developed 
economies. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature. 
According to the neoclassical model, with everything else given, emigration is driven by the 
difference in average income between destination and origin countries. Empirical evidence supporting 
the prediction of the negative relationship between emigration and income at home is provided, among 
others, in Hatton and Williamson (2005), Mayda (2010), Grogger and Hanson (2011), Ortega and Peri 
(2013), while results supporting the positive links with income abroad are in Hartog and Vriend (1989), 
Katseli and Glystos (1989), Lundborg (1991), Bauer and Zimmermann (1998).  
Differently from the neoclassical model, the ‘mobility transition’ hypothesis (Zelinsky, 1971) 
links emigration to demographic changes in the home country driven by modernization and 
industrialization. In it, the extra availability of resources determined by modernization initially leads 
to an acceleration of population growth, to a consequent scarcity of resources in the countryside, and, 
consequently, to an increase in the number of people searching for job opportunities in the cities and 
abroad. Information about other locations prompts a self-sustaining and accelerating process of 
people’s mobility from less advanced to more advanced regions and countries. At later stages of 
modernization, fertility declines, migration to more advanced locations ceases and eventually the 
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country becomes itself a magnet for immigration. In Hatton and Williamson (1994), the European 
mass emigration of past centuries follows a similar pattern. It increases in the early stages of 
industrialization, but industrialization leads to more education, which has a negative effect on fertility 
and, after a certain point, on emigration. Faini and Venturini (1993), focus on emigration from 
Southern Europe and particularly Italy. They find that mass emigration from the mid nineteenth 
century increased with income growth, to decrease, in the second part of the twentieth century, when 
Italy reached middle-income levels.  
Other studies find that European mass emigrations from the second half of the nineteenth century 
were driven by technological progress through dramatic increases in global trade, and not just changes 
in demography. Cheap imports from distant regions of the world substituted agricultural products in 
big areas of Western Europe, pushing huge numbers of people out from the countryside and, in many 
cases, from the home countries. Lower transport costs made transcontinental migration easier (Baines, 
1992). On the other hand, the spread of industrialization created job opportunities at home and 
weakened the incentives to emigrate from the regions where it arrived earlier. In the areas of Europe 
where industrialization arrived late, such as Ireland, the south of Italy or parts of Scandinavia – 
especially Sweden –, emigration movements continued to be subject to global competition on 
agricultural products. In years of bad crops, famine, or abundant crops in foreign countries and low 
agricultural prices, departures increased substantially (Lowell, 1987; Hatton and Williamson, 1997).  
Partly contradicting the thesis of a bell-shaped relationship between income and emigration from Italy, 
Faini and Venturini (1993) and Del Boca and Venturini (2005) find that emigration flows from the 
poorer and less developed regions in the South of the country lasted much longer than those from the 
rapidly industrializing regions of the North.  
Recent studies that test the links of emigration with income, rather than with development, find 
inverted-U relationships between the two variables when considering between-countries variations 
(Martin and Taylor,1996; de Haas 2007, 2010, 2011; Vogler and Rotte, 2000; Clemens, 2014). These 
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relationships tend to become weaker, non-significant or even negative, when the tests include within-
country variations and control for several cofactors (Dao et al. 2018a, 2018b; Ortega and Peri, 2013, 
Murat, 2020). However, despite this lack of robustness, an inverted-U relationship between emigration 
and income it is often taken as a stylized fact, from which follows the prediction of strong immigration 
into rich countries as poor economies grow (Clemens and Sandefur, 2015). 
  
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1 Data. 
The dataset comprises 130 developing countries and 25 years, from 1991 and 2015. Emigrant 
data are extracted from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs – Population 
Division. Since figures are available every 5 years, missing observations from each country have been 
imputed by taking the averages of the two nearest available figures. United Nations data comprise both 
overall and refugee emigration. In order to have a better proxy of net emigration, I have subtracted the 
number of refugees from the overall figure in each country-year. The emigrant rate is the stock of 
emigrants divided by the population of the origin country.1 The proportion of emigrants moving to 
either developing or developed countries is the percentage of total emigrants from the origin country 
moving to each type of destination each year; these percentages are computed from UN data on 
emigration. A complete list of variables and sources is in Table A1. 
 
3.2 Emigration and income. Preliminary evidence. 
To gauge the relationship between emigration and income, I first consider nonparametric 
estimations based on between-country variations; subsequently, in the next Sections, I include more 
complete estimation specifications. Figure 1 depicts the relationship between emigration and per capita 
                                                            
1 In Dao et al. (2018a) the emigration rate corresponds to the changes in emigrant stocks between 2000 and 2010 as a 
percentage of the resident population in 2000. Since the resident population may also vary between periods, I adopt the 
emigrant stock/population indicator, where numerator and denominator vary with time. A similar indicator is in Clemens 
(2014). Data on bilateral migrant flows would be also useful for this research, but its availability is limited to few countries.  
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income in the home country as a cross-section, with the values of the two variables in each country 
averaged over the period considered. Results show that the correlation between emigration and income 
is negative at very low income levels and afterwards approximates an inverted-U curve, but loses 
significance as income increases. This pattern roughly replicates findings of above cited studies on the 
emigration-income relationship (among them, de Haas 2007, 2010a, 2010b; Clemens, 2014; Dao et al. 
2018a). The turning point in Figure 1 corresponds to an average income level of about 6,600 PPP US$ 
(2011)2 (the average incomes of countries such as Albania, Indonesia, Paraguay, during the period 
considered). I find approximately the same value if I use per capita GDP rather that its natural log 
transformation and the variation of the emigrant stock (Emigration stockt – Emigration stockt-
j)/Populationt-j, as in Dao et al. (2018a), while I find a slightly higher value if I use the level of per 
capita GPD and the Emigration stock/ Population rate, as in Clemens (2014). Figures A1 and A2 in 
the Appendix depict both paths.3  
Figure 2 presents the results of a different nonparametric specification, which concerns the 
relationship between changes in emigration and changes in income considered at five-year intervals. 
It allows to check whether the cross-section specification can be omitting important constant (or slowly 
changing) factors that affect both variables. As Figure 2 clearly shows, moderate increases in income 
are correlated with negative changes in emigration, while there is no significant correlation for wider 
income expansions (at the right of Figure 2). Hence, strong income increases and emigration variations 
can be negatively related and, more generally, the bell-shaped relationship between the two variables 
of Figure 1 can be spurious.  
Observing the relationships between emigration and income disaggregated at the country level 
is also useful. Figure 3 depicts the non-parametric estimations of the correlations between emigration 
                                                            
2 All figures in the paper regarding $US are $US 2011 PPP.  
3 Partly because of the lower availability of data from low-income countries, especially in the initial years of the period 
considered, I find the relationship between emigration and income to be less significant at very low levels of income. Dao 
et al (2018a) exclude countries with an average income below a certain threshold and at war while, as Clemens (2014) and 
other authors, they include developed countries.  
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and income run country by country.4 The picture clearly evidences that emigration paths from countries 
with the same income levels can differ substantially. Moreover, while at low-income levels they tend 
to be downward-sloping – emigration decreases as income increases–, at higher income levels they 
show a higher heterogeneity: some paths are upward-sloping and others decreasing.   
It is interesting to note that the left side of Figure 3 (as well as that of Figure 1) comprises many 
countries of Sub-Saharan Africa, while the right side includes several middle-income economies of 
Eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union. Among low-income countries, a bell-shaped 
relationship in Rwanda might seem to support to the mobility transition hypothesis, but emigration 
from the country grew rapidly during war years, to decrease also rapidly afterwards. Emigration 
movements from Liberia, Mozambique, Burkina Faso, Central African Republic, Ethiopia, and other 
low-income countries are negatively correlated with income. The correlation is also negative in 
countries, such as Côte d'Ivoire, Gabon, Madagascar, Niger, Venezuela, Zimbabwe, where income 
contractions are accompanied by higher emigration. A distinct case is China, where an extremely high 
growth of income is accompanied by a substantially flat emigration rate. Among middle-income 
countries, emigration rates from Armenia, Bosnia, Albania, Kazakhstan are positively and strongly 
correlated with income, while those from Montenegro, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan 
are negatively correlated with it. This further suggests that unobserved omitted cofactors, which can 
be both time-invariant and time-varying, can be affecting the links between income and emigration. 
Together with income, other development indicators and cofactors are considered in the next Sections.  
 
4. Emigration and development. Semiparametric and parametric estimations. 
The results of Figures 1, 2 and 3 suggest that income alone would be a poor predictor of any 
potential relationship between emigration and development. The following specifications comprise 
                                                            
4 Since time is not depicted, the paths of countries where income varied less during the 25 years considered are shorter, 
and vice versa. 
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further proxies of development – such as education and population growth– and their interactions, and 
controls for variables frequently used in the empirical literature on emigration.   
4.1. Semiparametric estimation 
I start from a semiparametric specification with countries fixed effects, based on Robinson 
(1988) and Verardi and Debarsy (2012), where ln pcGDP is the nonparametric component:    
 
 (Emigrant stock/Population)it =  f(ln pcGDPit) + 1School life expectancyit + 
2Population growthit + 3(School life expectancy*Population growth)it + 
4Political terrorit + 5Unemploymentit +6Inequalityit + 7Passport powerit + 
8Climate changeit + t + ai + it 
(1)
 
where (Emigrant stock/Population)it is the emigrant outward stock into the rest of the world from 
country i at time t – net of the corresponding refugee outward stock – divided by country i’s Population 
(number of people residing in country i) at time t; f(ln pcGDPit) is a nonparametric function of the 
natural log of per capita GDP. No hypothesis is made on the form of f(ln pcGDPit).  School life 
expectancy is the expected years of schooling of the country’s population. Its relation with emigration 
is not signed a priori; higher average levels of education may facilitate the emigration to developed 
countries (Dao et al. 2018a), but can also be associated with more skilled jobs at home and weaken the 
incentives to emigrate. Also, as seen above, education can be associated with lower fertility rates. The 
rate of Population growth should be positively correlated with emigration (Dao et al., 2018b), but the 
sign of the interaction between education and the population growth rate, School life 
expectancy*Population growth, is expected to be negative (Hatton and Williamson 1994). Political 
terror an ordinal variable that varies from one to five – with five being the highest level of political 
terror – and a proxy for various factors concerning conflict, political unrest and war, should boost 
emigration, but its sign could be negative if the unrest impedes leaving the country (in Hatton, 2009, 
and Hatton, 2016, political terror strongly affects refugee emigration, but it can also be expected to 
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influence the emigration of people who do not apply for refugee status). The coefficient on the rate of 
Unemployment is expected to be positive. Passport powerthe number of visa-free destinations that 
people from the origin country can freely access, is a proxy of the political, institutional, and economic 
links of the home country with foreign economies; stronger links should facilitate emigration.5 The 
Gini index, Inequality, is used as a proxy of the country’s degree of uneven income distribution, which 
is expected to be positively correlated with emigration (Katarzyna and Kliber, 2018). Climate change 
measured as the deviation between the country’s annual temperatures during the period considered and 
the averages during years 1901-24, is expected to encourage emigration (Coniglio and Pesce, 2015; 
Cattaneo and Peri, 2016; Beine and Parsons, 2017, Burzynski et al. 2019)t are time dummies andi 
are country effects; it is the error term. 
 
4.2. Results of semiparametric estimations. 
Figures 4.a to 4.d depict the patterns of the emigration-income relationship resulting from the 
semiparametric regressions of equation (1), while the coefficients on cofactors are in Table 1. To save 
space, the coefficients related to Figures 4.a and 4.b, concerning country and country and time effects 
respectively, are not reported in Table 1.  In it, column (1)  comprises all cofactors plus time and 
country effects and is related to the emigration-income path of Figure 4.c; column (2) includes also 
the interaction between the variables School life expectancy and Population growth and is associated 
to Figure 4.d. Overall, the sequence in Figures from 4.a to 4.d, show that the correlation between 
emigration and income is always decreasing at low-income levels, and that, depending on the controls 
included into the regression, it can be flat or slightly bell-shaped at middle-income levels. Hence, the 
emigration-income relationship follows a sinusoidal path, where the U-shaped part is robust to the 
inclusion of the various cofactors, while the flat or bell-shaped part is not.  
                                                            
5 Visas and passport power concern short-term travel, but they appear to be correlated with permanent 
migration in Mau et al. (2015), Czaika and de Haas (2017), Neumayer (2006). 
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Most coefficients in the parametric part of the regressions (columns 1 and 2, Table 1) have the 
expected signs. Among them, the country’s international links with other economies, measured by 
Passport power, are strongly, positively and significantly correlated with emigration.6 The coefficient 
on School life expectancy in column (1) is negative although non-significant, and, as expected, the 
coefficient of the interaction between the variable and population growth is negative and significant 
(column 2, Table 1). Hence, schooling can be associated with emigration directly, and indirectly 
through its negative association with the expansion of the country’s population.  
 
4.3. Parametric estimation 
Further tests based on full parametric specifications are useful to check for the robustness of 
results and gain a deeper understanding of the interactions among the three proxies of development 
used in this study: income, education and demographics. Hence, in what follows I use a specification 
that comprises the income variable among the parametric regressors. The sinusoidal shape of the 
emigration-income correlation in Figures 4.a to 4.d suggests the inclusion of income into the equation 
as a third-degree polynomial. Moreover, since the literature on economic growth hypothesises a 
positive relationship between education and income, the specification includes the interaction between 
these two variables and, as above, that between schooling and population growth. 
 
 Emigrant stock/Populationit =  1ln pcGDPit + 2(ln pcGDPit)2 +  3(ln 
pcGDPit)3 + 4((ln pcGDPit)*School life expectancy) 5((ln pcGDPit)2*School 
life expectancy) +  6((ln pcGDPit)3*School life expectancy) +  1School life 
expectancyit + 2Population growthit + 3(Population growth*School life 
(2)
                                                            
6 Potential endogeneity can make the coefficient on Passport power to be underestimated. Travel restrictions implemented 
by a country with respect to a specific foreign country are likely to deter immigration originating from the latter, but also 
overall emigration from it, and temporary and return migration. Czaika and de Hass (2017), find a detrimental effect of 
visa restrictions on permanent and circular migration. The opposite applies to travel liberalization.  
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expectancy)it + 4Political terrorit + 5Unemploymentit +6Inequalityit + 
7Passport powerit + 8Climate changeit + t + i + it 
 
4.4. Results of parametric estimations 
Columns (3) and (4) of Table 1 show that all coefficients on income are significant and have 
the expected signs; moreover, post estimation t-tests confirm the correctness of the polynomial 
specification. The predicted emigration-income paths resulting from the parametric regressions in 
columns (3) and (4) are in Figures 4.e and 4.f. As above, they are decreasing at low-income levels and, 
more neatly than in the semiparametric specifications, they increase and become bell-shaped at middle-
income-levels. A comparison across specifications, from Figure 4.a to 4.f, evidences an overall 
uniformity of decreasing or U-shaped paths at low-income levels, and differences at higher income 
levels, regarding both the shapes of the curves and their significance. It can be also observed that 
minimum turning points occur at income levels ranging from 1,400$ (Figure 4.d) to 2,000$ US (Figure 
4.f), while the maxima range between 18,000$ and 20,000$ in Figures 4.e and 4.f, but are undefined 
in the semiparametric specifications, from Figures 4.a to 4.d. 
The coefficients on cofactors in the parametric regressions (columns 3 and 4, Table 1) are very 
similar to those in the semi-parametric tests (columns 1 and 2). The direct relationship between School 
life expectancy and emigration is the same of column (1), but now is significant (column 3).  Higher 
education levels in the origin country are associated with less emigration. The levels of significance 
on Political terror and Gini index are higher in columns (3) and (4) than in the semiparametric 
regressions, while the positive and significant coefficients on Passport power are about the same in 
both specifications. The coefficients of the interactions between income and education are non-
significant, but the negative coefficient on the interaction between School life expectancy and 
Population growth (column 4) is significant and similar to that in column (2). Higher education at 
home is also associated with lower population growth. Hence, education is negatively linked with 
emigration, both directly and indirectly, through a slower population expansion. This confirms the 
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overall robustness of results. Other robustness controls have been accomplished by running regressions 
that include another climate change indicator – built as the deviations between the country’s annual 
rains with respect to the corresponding averages during years 1901-24 –, and the number of people 
affected by natural disasters (Naudé, 2010; Neumayer, 2005). In both cases, results were non-
significant. 
 
4.5 Emigration and development indicators. Simulations. 
Results above show that the relationships between emigration and the main development 
indicators, such as income, education and population growth, are non-linear. Hence, it can be useful 
to consider how the migration-income relationships vary when education and population growth take 
different values. In Figure 5, emigration-income paths vary with School life expectancy and Population 
growth computed at different levels. Simulations are based on the coefficients of regression of column 
4 in Table 1. Specifically, in Figures 5.a, b and c, population growth rates are computed at 2.6 percent, 
1.6 percent and 0.6 percent, respectively. At the same time, in each Figure 5.a to 5.c, School life 
expectancy is computed at six, nine and 12 years. The values chosen for the simulations on population 
growth are centred around the sample mean rate, which is about of 1.6 percent (while the average rate 
of Sub-Saharan countries of 2.6 percent). On the other hand, the values chosen for the simulations on 
education levels are roughly centred on the mean value of school life expectancy in our sample, which 
is of 9.5 years. The mean values of these variables in different world regions are in Table A3, in the 
Appendix. 
Figure 5 clearly shows that with low rates of population growth (typically associated with 
development reaching middle and upper levels), the U-shaped part of the emigration-income path –– 
expands and shifts down, while the bell-shaped right side shrinks and shifts to the right (Figures 5.a to 
5.c). Hence, with slower demographics, the relationship between emigration and income, which is 
negative at low income levels, remains negative along a longer range of levels of income. For example, 
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given a population growth rate of 2.6 percent (Figure 5.a) and a level of expected education of nine 
years, an increase in income from 1,400$ to 1,800$ is associated with a rate of emigration (Emigrant 
stock/Population) of 0.048 that remains constant with the increase in income. However, the same 
increase in income, with the same level of schooling (nine years), but a lower population growth rate, 
of 0.6 percent, is correlated with a substantially lower and decreasing rate of emigration: from 0.039 
it becomes 0.038 (Figure 5.c). 
The relationships of emigration with income also varies according to average education in the 
home country. In the range of middle-income levels, more years of expected education are associated 
with lower emigration rates (Figures 5.a to 5.c).7 At the two extremes, of very low and very high 
average income, higher education appears to be correlated with more emigration, but these predicted 
paths are less realistic than the intermediate ones. In particular, there are very few countries having  
low income and high education levels, and the opposite is also rare. Hence, overall, the most 
representative paths in Figures 5.a to 5.c are the lowest one (corresponding to low education) at low-
income levels, the intermediate one at middle-income levels, and the highest one at the upper middle-
income levels.  
The non-linear shape of these relationships may reflect the changing characteristics of 
emigration movements as home countries develop. In particular, the empirical evidence provided by 
international data shows that most emigrants originating from the less developed countries move to 
other developing economies. Often driven by push factors, such as bad crops, excessively low levels 
of resources or strong political instability, they move to nearby countries that often provide only 
slightly better economic or political conditions than those at home. Hence, more resources, slower 
demographics and higher average education in the origin country weaken these push factors. On the 
other hand, most emigrants from countries at higher levels of development move to rich economies. 
                                                            
7 The fall is larger when population growth is still high (Figure 5.a), and smaller with slower demographics (Figures 5.b 
and 5.c). In the second case, emigration rates are already low. 
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For them, pull factors, such as better job or life opportunities, matter more. Higher average education 
levels at home can facilitate their movements, but reinforce also the  incentives to remain.8 Together 
with countries structural characteristics, which will be seen below, this can help to explain why, in 
Figure 3, emigration patterns from middle-income economies are more heterogeneous than from low-
income countries. 
 
4.6 Long-run factors 
Several countries’ characteristics that are fixed in time or vary very slowly may affect 
emigration, but they are not observed in the above regressions because they are ‘absorbed’ into the 
countries’ fixed-effects. Hence, in what follows, the influence their influence is tested indirectly by 
regressing the fixed-effects coefficients of column (4) of Table 1 on long-run factors that are often 
significant in the emigration literature. Specifically, I consider whether the country is an oil producer, 
a former socialist economy, a former socialist country directly affected by the fall of the Berlin Wall, 
a former British or Portuguese colony, the average life expectancy and literacy rate of its population 
during the period considered, and the world area it is located in.  
Figure 7 depicts the results of these correlations. Black continuous lines denote a coefficient 
significance above five percent, grey dotted lines denote a significance below 10 percent and their 
length is the size of the standard error. They show that, everything else given, less people than predicted 
choose to emigrate if the country is an oil producer. This can be due to the direct and indirect job 
opportunities that the oil sector provides. On the other hand, being a former socialist country increases 
the likelihood of emigration, and the propensity to emigrate from countries directly related to the fall 
of the Berlin Wall is even higher than that from the average of former socialist economies. 
                                                            
8 The different main destinations of emigrants will be seen in greater detail below. Higher education levels in countries at 
the early stages of development may be associated with more opportunities at home – such as the growth of the industrial 
and services sectors – but still be not sufficient to significantly facilitate the access to developed countries. Differently, 
more education in countries at middle levels of development can ease the access of emigrants into the rich economies. The 
process is reversed when the home countries become themselves more attractive. 
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Interestingly, Figure 3 above shows that, among middle-income countries, decreasing slopes 
(emigration decreases with income) are more frequent among former republics of the Soviet Union 
that are also oil producers. Life expectancy levels are not significant. This can be due to their effects 
being already captured by time-varying cofactors – such as education levels – in the regressions. The 
coefficients on world areas show that predicted emigration from an average Eastern European country 
is above average values. This is consistent with the above results on former socialist countries linked 
to the Berlin Wall. A similar result applies for the average country in Central Asia. In this case, push 
factors, such as long-run political instability and poor institutions can help to explain the higher than 
expected propensity to emigrate. At the same time, emigration from either South America or Sub-
Saharan Africa is significantly below predicted values. This can be explained by a prevalence of 
internal migration, especially within bigger countries, in these two regions.  
 
4.7 Developed and developing destinations 
Since the above dataset comprises emigration from each country to the rest of the world, 
emigration destinations are not considered. A different database, including bilateral data, could help 
to analyse this issue, but the number of observations, especially from low-income countries, would  be 
substantially reduced.9 Another possibility, common to many studies on migration, would be a dataset 
based only on immigration into OECD economies, on which more data are available, but it would also 
be biased because, as it will be seen below, it would select observations from origin countries. 
An alternative way to answer this question is by splitting this paper’s database according to the 
emigrants’ main destinations: developing and developed. This information is provided by the 
UNESCO data source, on which this study’s is based. In this paper’s sample, on average, 51.7 percent 
of emigrants move to a developed destination. Hence, to consider the relationship between each type 
                                                            
9 Data on bilateral migration are provided by the Global Bilateral Migration Database, published by the World Bank, but 
they are available only at 10-year intervals, from years 1960 to 2000.  
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of emigration and the level of development at home, the data are split into country-year observations 
falling below and above the 51.7 sample average, and the regression of equation (2) is re-run on each 
subsample. Figure 6 depicts the two predicted emigration-income paths; they intersect at an income 
level of 2,500 $US and rapidly diverge thereafter. At the left of the intersection, concerning countries 
the lowest income levels, both paths are downwards sloping: emigration diminishes as income at home 
increases. This supports the above interpretation that low-income countries’ emigration is mostly 
dictated by push factors, and diminishes as conditions at home improve.  
At the right of the intersection, both rates increase, but, at each income level, the increase is 
more rapid when the majority of emigrants move to developed destinations. As in Figure 3 above, the 
same income levels at home can be associated with very different emigration paths. In Figure 6, the 
divergence between the two paths is associated with substantially different values taken by the 
countries’ development indicators.10 Most emigrants move to developed destinations when the average 
level of schooling is 10.4 years, and the mean rate of population growth is 1.04 percent. On the other 
hand, most emigrants move to other developing countries when education levels are low and 
population growth is rapid; they are, respectively, 8.5 years and 2.5 percent. The geographical 
composition of countries is also different along the two paths. For example, the proportion of Sub-
Saharan countries in the subsample with most emigrants moving to other developing countries is 55 
percent, while in the subsample concerning emigration to developed destinations, it falls to 11 percent. 
At the right of the intersection between the two paths, the proportion of emigrants from Sub-Saharan 
Africa falls further, to a 4.4 percent. Hence, the positive relationship between emigration into 
developed countries and income at home concerns only marginally the Sub-Saharan countries. On the 
other hand, the proportion Eastern-European countries in the sample with most emigrants moving to 
developed destinations is 25 percent, and is one percent among the subset concerning emigration to 
                                                            
10 The relative minimum of the continuous path –  regarding economies where most emigrants move to other developing 
economies -  takes place at an income of 2,700$, which is higher than that of the overall sample in Figure 4-f. This supports 
the finding that emigration from low-income and low-development countries diminishes as conditions in the home country 
improve.  
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developing destinations (Eastern European countries are the 13 percent of the overall sample).11 More 
generally, immigration into the rich economies increases especially from countries at middle levels of 
development. At any given income level, their education levels are higher and their population growth 
rates are lower than the average developing country. The opposite applies to emigration into 
developing countries.12  
The coefficients resulting from running the specification of equation (2) on the two subsamples  
are in Table 2. It is interesting to note that, while they are similar to those concerning the entire sample 
in Table 1, the interactions between population growth and education and between income and 
education are significant only when most emigrants move to other developing countries (column 2, 
Table 2). This supports the common finding of the development literature, of a positive relationship 
between education and income, and of a negative link between education and population growth. These 
same coefficients are not significant in countries with a majority of emigrants moving to developed 
destinations (column 4). As seen, in these origin countries, population growth rates are generally 
already low and school life expectancy is high. Political terror is another strong push factor in 
countries with emigrants moving to other developing economies, while the same variable has non-
significant coefficients in column (4). On the other hand, when most emigrants move to the developed 
destinations, Inequality and Passport power have strong and significant coefficients.  
 
 
4.8 Emigration rates and levels. 
                                                            
11 For example, at an income of about 3,300$, the average country from which most emigrants move to another 
developing country (the lower path) is characterized by a school life expectancy of 7.7 years, a population growth rate of 
2.3 percent, a level of political terror of 3.3, and a very low passport power, of 38.  Countries with these characteristics 
are Angola, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Yemen. At the same income of 3,300$, the average country with most 
emigrants moving to a developed economy (the upper path) is characterized by a school life expectancy of 9.3 years, a 
population growth rate of 0.9 percent, a level of political terror of 2.8, and a passport power of 49. Among these countries 
are Moldova, Philippines, Honduras. The same exercise on income levels above the intersection value in Figure 6 
produce similar results. 
12 Everything else equal, average schooling in the home country can affect emigration to developed economies because 
destination countries tend to officially recognize foreign academic degrees and skills of individuals originating from 
countries with at least similar educational levels and institutions. 
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The above results are robust to different specifications but concern emigration ratios and not 
levels. Hence, they do not rule out the possibility of an increase in the number of emigrants as ratios 
decrease, for example if population at home grows faster than emigration. Vice versa, emigration ratios 
could increase even with decreasing emigration numbers, if population decreases but emigration falls 
at a slower speed. The first case might apply to low-income countries, particularly in Africa, where 
population growth rates are high, and the second to Eastern European economies, where population 
growth can be negative.13  
 To check whether this study’s main findings hold when the number rather than the ratio of 
emigrants is considered, I rerun the above regressions with the (log) of the number of emigrants as 
dependent variable. The specifications remain those of equations (1) and (2), but, to control for size, 
the (log) of countries’ population is now included among regressors. Figure 8 shows that results 
support the above findings and add some further insights. In the first place, in both the semiparametric 
and parametric estimations of Figures 8.a and 8.b, the relationships between emigration and income 
are negative. This confirms this paper’s main results along the range of low-income levels, but diverges 
from above for which concerns middle-income levels, where numbers are negative while ratios were 
positive (in Figures 4 and 5). The reasons of this discrepancy become more evident by considering 
emigration to the two main types of destination.  
In Figure 8.c, emigration moving mostly to other developing countries decreases continuously 
with income, while emigration moving mainly to the developed economies is bell-shaped at middle 
income levels. Hence, emigration from middle-income countries to developed economies increases 
both in numbers and rates, while that to developing destinations decreases both as a ratio and in levels. 
The aggregate negative patterns in Figures 8.a and 8.b are driven by the rapidly decreasing path of the 
latter.   
                                                            
13 Dao et al. (2018) predict a rapid growth of foreign population in Western economies as a consequence of high 
population growth in low-income countries, especially Sub Saharan Africa, while Kebede et al. (2019) find that increases 
in girls’ schooling in Africa rapidly drives down fertility and population growth rates, as it previously happened in Asia 
and Latin America. 
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Hence, this study shows that that emigration from low-income countries tends to decrease with 
development, both as a ratio of the home country population and in levels, while the part from middle-
income countries that is directed to the developed economies increases before reaching a maximum 
and declines afterwards.  
 
5. Conclusions 
This study investigated the links between development and emigration with a dataset 
comprising 130 developing countries and 25 years. Using semiparametric and parametric 
specifications and controlling for several cofactors and fixed effects, I found that emigration from low- 
to middle-income countries decreases as income grows, education improves or population growth 
slows down. A bell-shaped relationship with income emerges at middle-development levels, but it is 
not robust to all specifications. When emigrant numbers, rather than emigration rates, are considered, 
the relationship with income is downward-sloping along all income levels. Hence, emigration from 
countries with low- to middle-income levels decreases as countries develop, both as a ratio of the 
country’s population and in numbers.  
When countries rich a middle stage of development, defined by income, education and 
demographics, a growing part of emigration moves to rich countries. This growth persists only to the 
point that the origin country, with development, becomes a magnet of immigration itself. Hence, 
immigration into rich countries is predicted to grow from countries at middle-development levels, 
while policies aimed to boost development in low-income countries and international aid tend to 
reduce emigration.  
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Figure 1. – Emigration and income  Figure 2. – Variations in emigration and income  
 
Note: Between-country variations, country means over 25 
years. The sample is an unbalanced panel comprising 130 
countries and 25 years. Non-parametric regression using 
Epanechnikov kernel (Epanechnikov 1969), local mean 
smoothing, bandwidth 1.61, degree 3, pwi 2.11. 
 Note: 5 year variations: (Emigration stock t - Emigration stock 
t-5/Population t-5) and ln pc GDPt  ln pc - GDP t-5. The 
sample is an unbalanced panel comprising 130 countries and 
25 years. Non-parametric regression using Epanechnikov 
kernel, local mean smoothing,  bandwidth 0.03, degree 3, 
pwidth 0.4. 
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Figure 3.- Emigration and income, by country 
 
 
                                  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Local polynomial smoothing.  The sample is an unbalanced panel comprising 130 countries and 
25 years. 
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Table 1. – Dependent variable: Emigration rates. Semiparametric and parametric estimations. 
  Semiparametric Parametric 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
          
ln pcGDP -1.745*** -1.607***
      (0.184) (0.287) 
(ln pcGDP)2 0.208*** 0.206***
      (0.023) (0.035) 
(ln pcGDP)3     -0.008*** -0.009*** 
      (0.001) (0.001) 
ln pcGDP*School life expectancy       -0.049 
        (0.031) 
(ln pcGDP)2*School life expectancy       0.004 
        (0.004) 
(ln pcGDP)3*School life expectancy       -0.000 
        (0.000) 
School life expectancy*Population growth   -0.002***   -0.002*** 
    (0.001)   (0.000) 
School life expectancy -0.002 0.002 -0.002*** 0.171** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.087) 
Population growth 0.006* 0.022*** 0.006*** 0.022*** 
  (0.003) (0.007) (0.002) (0.005) 
Political terror 0.002 0.002 0.002** 0.002*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployment rate -0.076 -0.085 -0.062*** -0.069*** 
  (0.054) (0.054) (0.020) (0.020) 
Gini index 0.023 0.015 0.018** 0.015* 
  (0.019) (0.021) (0.007) (0.008) 
Passport power 0.086*** 0.078** 0.091*** 0.081*** 
  (0.032) (0.032) (0.011) (0.011) 
Temperature deviation -0.000 -0.000   
  (0.001)   (0.001)   
Constant     4.797*** 4.071*** 
      (0.489) (0.773) 
Time effects yes yes yes yes 
Country effects yes yes yes yes 
Observations 2,563 2,563 2,563 2,587
R-squared 0.927 0.930 0.936 0.939 
Note: The sample is an unbalanced panel comprising 130 countries and 25 years. Dependent variable: Emigrant 
stocksit/Populationit. Standard errors, clustered at the country level, in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Columns 1-2: Fixed effects semiparametric. Columns 3-4 Fixed effects pooled OLS. Predicted patterns of 
Emigration rates are in Figure 4 (c)-(d). 
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Figure 4.  Emigration rates and income. Semiparametric and parametric estimations 
 
 
Note: The sample is an unbalanced panel comprising 130 countries and 25 years. Predicted emigration from semiparametric 
estimations in Figures (a)-(d), with ln pc GDP non parametric. In Figures (a) and (b), the only regressors are country and country 
and time fixed effects. Figures (c) and (d) derive from the semiparametric regressions of columns 1 and 2 in Table 1; Figures (e) 
and (f) from the parametric regressions of columns 3 and 4 in Table 1. The paths minima correspond to income levels, in the 
semiparametric regressions (a, b, c, d) of about 1,400 US$, in the parametric regressions (e, f) of about 2,000 US$. The maxima, 
parametric regressions take place at income levels of about 22,000 us$. 
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Figure 5. – Emigration and income. Different levels of 
education and population growth rates 
 
Note:  The sample is an unbalanced panel comprising 130 countries and 25 years. 
Predicted emigration rates, 95% CIs, from column 4, Table 1, with Population 
growth rates at 0.6, 1.6 and 2.6, and School life expectancy at 6, 9 and 12 years. 
the two segments between vertical lines correspond to income levels between 
1,400 US$ and 1,800 US$, and between 17,000 US$ and 22,000 US$.
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Figure 6. – Main destinations of emigration: developed economies and 
developing countries  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Local polynomial smoothing of predicted emigration rates, 95 percent CIs, from columns (2) 
and (4) of Table 3. The sample is an unbalanced panel comprising 130 countries and 25 years; split 
into two subsamples: one with proportion of emigration to developed economies > 51.7 percent, the 
other with proportion < 51.7 percent.  Coordinates of world regions: mean ln pc GDP and emigration 
rates; related figures: average proportion of emigration from the region to developed countries. The 
paths minima correspond to income levels: --- 1,100 US$, __ 2,400 US$, and the maxima --- 22,000, 
__ 18,000 US$. 
 
  29
Table 2.-  Dependent variable: emigration share to developed and developing 
economies  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Most to developing Most to developed 
ln pcGDP -1.371*** -0.844** -2.522*** -5.489*** 
  (0.185) (0.359) (0.530) (1.845) 
(ln pcGDP)2 0.158*** 0.106** 0.306*** 0.697*** 
  (0.023) (0.043) (0.063) (0.221) 
(ln pcGDP)3 -0.006*** -0.004** -0.012*** -0.029*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.009) 
ln pcGDP*School life expectancy   -0.098**   0.193 
    (0.040)   (0.186) 
(ln pcGDP)2*School life expectancy   0.011**   -0.027 
    (0.005)   (0.022) 
(ln pcGDP)3*School life expectancy   -0.000**   0.001 
    (0.000)   (0.001) 
School life expectancy*Population growth   -0.002***   -0.001 
    (0.000)   (0.001) 
School life expectancy -0.002** 0.299*** -0.002* -0.448 
 (0.001) (0.112) (0.001) (0.529) 
Population growth 0.007*** 0.025*** -0.001 0.008 
  (0.002) (0.005) (0.001) (0.007) 
Political terror 0.004*** 0.005*** -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Unemployment rate -0.029 -0.027 -0.110*** -0.121*** 
  (0.018) (0.017) (0.033) (0.034) 
Gini index -0.016** -0.014* 0.076*** 0.071*** 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.017) (0.018) 
Passport power 0.035*** 0.029*** 0.121*** 0.113*** 
  (0.012) (0.010) (0.015) (0.016) 
Constant 3.910*** 2.175** 6.747*** 14.098*** 
  (0.502) (0.978) (1.450) (5.126) 
Time effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Country effects yes  yes  yes  yes  
Observations 1,243 1,243 1,344 1,344 
R-squared 0.836 0.857 0.954 0.955 
Robust standard errors, clustered at country levels, in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The sample is an unbalanced 
panel comprising 130 countries and 25 years. Subsamples: proportion of emigrants to developed economies < 51.7 percent 
(columns 1 and 2);  and  proportion of emigrants to developed economies >  51.7 percent (columns 3 and 4). 
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Figure 7. – Countries’ characteristics and fixed effects coefficients 
 
 
 
                       
Note: Each variable is regressed on FE coefficients from column (4) of Table 1. Significance:      at or above 
5%;     below 10%;           standard errors. Oil producers: binary variable with value one for oil producers and 
zero otherwise. Berlin wall and Socialist: binary variables, with, respectively, value one for Eastern European 
former socialist countries and zero otherwise, and value one for former socialist economies and zero otherwise. 
Life expectancy: average life expectation at year of birth. Brit Port colony: binary variable with value one for 
former British and Portuguese colonies and zero otherwise. 
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Figure 8. – Number of  emigrants and average income (in logs) 
 
 
                           
Note: Local polynomial smoothing, 95 percent CIs. The sample is an unbalanced panel comprising 130 countries 
and 25 years. (a) Ln Emigrants to the rest of the world. (b) Subsamples: proportion of emigrants to developed 
economies > 51.7 percent; to developing: proportion to developed < 51.7 percent. Predicted values deriving from 
equation (2), with dependent variable ln Emigrants, all cofactors plus ln population, and time and country fixed 
effects. The maximum in Figure (b) corresponds to a per capita income level of 13,500 US$. 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  32
APPENDIX 
Appendix I. Tables and Figures 
 
Table A1. - Variables and sources 
Variable  Description  Source 
Emigrant outward stock Number of people who emigrated from 
origin country. 
UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs 
– Population Division, International migration 
stock: The 2015 revision. 
Emigrant rate Emigrant outward stock/Population of 
origin country 
Population: World Bank, Health, Nutrition and 
Population statistics - Population, total. 
Refugee outward stock  Number of people who have fled a 
certain country and have been 
recognized as refugees. 
UNHCR, Population statistics, Time Series - 
Refugee data. Data utilized to obtain the net 
emigrant stock. 
Per capita GDP, PPP Gross domestic product per capita, 
converted to constant 2011 
international dollars using purchasing 
power parity rates. 
World Bank, Economy and growth data - GDP 
per capita, PPP (constant 2011 international $). 
Population growth rate (Populationt –Populationt-1)/ 
Populationt-1 
Population: World Bank, Health, Nutrition and 
Population statistics - Population, total. 
School life expectancy  Expected number of years of education 
that a child can expect to receive in the 
future. 
UNESCO Statistics 
Passport power Ranking of world’s passports 
according to the number of destinations 
their holders can access without a prior 
visa. Based on data from the 
International Air Transport Association 
(IATA). Data before 2006 are imputed 
from subsequent figures.  
Henley passport index 
https://www.henleypassportindex.com/passport-
index 
Unemployment  Share of labour force that is 
unemployed but available for 
employment. 
ILO STAT - Unemployment rate, by sex and 
age. 
Political Terror Scale 
(PTS) 
Index that shows the level of state 
political violence and terror, ranging 
between 1 (minimum terror) and 5 
(maximum terror), based on U.S. State 
Department Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices. 
Gibney M, Cornett L, Wood R, Haschke P, 
Arnon D (2016) The Political Terror Scale 
1976- 2015. Data retrieved from the Political 
Terror Scale website. 
Temperature Temperature in country j at time t 
minus average temperature in country j 
during 1901-1924. 
World Bank Climate Change Data Portal - 
historical climate data 
Rain Rain in country j at time t minus 
average rain in country j during 1901-
1924. 
World Bank Climate Change Data Portal - 
historical climate data 
Oil producing countries, 
Berlin Wall affected 
countries, Socialist 
countries, Former British 
or Portuguese former 
colonies. 
Dummies taking values zero or one. Bertocchi and Strozzi (2004). The Citizenship 
Law Database. 
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Disasters Number of people that lost their lives 
(or are missing) during a 
natural/technological disaster, summed 
to the number of the ‘total affected’, 
which are the people requiring 
immediate assistance, injured, or 
homeless because of the disaster. 
Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of 
Disasters, International Disaster Database 
Life expectancy Life expectancy at birth. World Bank statistics 
Countries: Afghanistan Albania Algeria Angola Argentina Armenia Azerbaijan Bahamas Bahrain Bangladesh Belarus Belize Benin 
Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Botswana Brazil Bulgaria Burkina Faso Burundi Cambodia Cameroon Central African Rep. Chad Chile 
China Hong Kong Macao Colombia Congo Costa Rica Cote d'Ivoire Croatia Cuba Czech Rep. Dem. Rep. of the Congo Djibouti 
Dominican Rep. Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Eritrea Estonia Ethiopia Gabon Gambia Georgia Ghana Guatemala Guinea Guinea-Bissau 
Honduras Hungary India Indonesia Iran Iraq Jamaica Jordan Kazakhstan Kenya Kuwait Kyrgyzstan Lao Latvia Lebanon Lesotho Liberia 
Libya Lithuania Madagascar Malawi Malaysia Mali Mauritania Mexico Mongolia Montenegro Morocco Mozambique Namibia Nepal 
Nicaragua Niger Nigeria Oman Pakistan Panama Papua New Guinea Paraguay Peru Philippines Poland Qatar Rep. of Moldova Romania 
Russian Federation Rwanda Saudi Arabia Senegal Serbia Sierra Leone Slovakia Slovenia Somalia South Africa Sri Lanka Sudan 
Swaziland Syrian Arab Rep. Tajikistan Thailand The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Togo Trinidad and Tobago Tunisia 
Turkey Turkmenistan Uganda Ukraine United Arab Emirates Tanzania Uruguay Uzbekistan Venezuela Viet Nam Yemen Zambia 
Zimbabwe. 
 
 
 
Table A2.- Descriptive statistics. Full sample and emigration to developed or 
developing destinations 
  Full sample   
Emigrants to developed, 
above sample mean   
Emigrants to developed, 
below sample mean 
  Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev.   Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev.   Obs Mean 
Std. 
Dev. 
Emigration rate 2,963 0.068 0.072   1,462 0.093 0.086   1,501 0.044 0.044 
Emigrants stock (thousand) 2,963 1,036 1,852   1,462 1,226 2,062   1,501 850 1,600 
Per capita GDP 2,963 10,213 15,823   1,462 10,257 7,516   1,501 10,171 20,961 
School life expectancy 2,672 9.5 2.4   1,336 10.4 1.6   1,336 8.6 2.6 
Population growth r. 2,962 1.79 1.63   1,462 1.07 1.28   1,500 2.49 1.62 
Political terror 2,906 2.85 1.03   1,428 2.70 0.94   1,478 2.99 1.09 
Passport power 3,164 52.73 30.89   1,568 60.84 34.02   1,596 44.77 25.04 
Gini index 3,014 42.06 9.62   1,557 40.85 9.12   1,457 43.35 9.98 
Unemployment rate 2,963 0.10 0.08   1,462 0.11 0.08   1,501 0.09 0.08 
ln Disasters 2,257 9.36 3.87   1,115 9.16 3.88   1,142 9.55 3.86 
Temperature 2,940 0.83 0.63   1,439 0.92 0.67   1,501 0.73 0.58 
Rain 2,916 0.19 14.99   1,424 1.42 16.04   1,492 -0.98 13.83 
Population (million) 2,963 43,761 156,177   1,462 34,784 119,691   1,501 52,505 184,543 
Note: The sample is an unbalanced panel comprising developing 130 countries and 25 years. Subsamples: proportion of emigrants 
to developed economies < 51.7 percent  and  proportion of emigrants to developed economies >  51.7 percent. 
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Table A3. Descriptive statistics of main development indicators. World regions 
  Obs. Mean S.D.   Obs. Mean S.D.   Obs. Mean S.D.   Obs. Mean S.D. 
  Eastern Europe   Central Asia   East Asia   Middle East 
GDP per capita 400 9.32 0.57   339 8.22 0.73   322 8.87 1.08   277 9.91 1.26 
Population gr. 439 -0.32 0.78   350 1.30 1.56   325 1.54 0.73   296 3.59 2.75 
School life 
expectancy 416 11.04 1.00   294 9.46 1.86   283 9.84 1.81   269 10.54 1.52 
  North Central Africa   Sub Saharan Africa   
North Central 
America   South America 
GDP per capita 117 9.12 0.48   1016 7.57 0.84   323 9.13 0.59   250 9.23 0.43 
Population gr. 125 1.53 0.49   1046 2.58 1.01   325 1.48 0.78   250 1.40 0.51 
School life 
expectancy 115 10.56 1.80   909 7.57 2.63   299 10.38 1.26   240 11.34 1.18 
Note: The sample is an unbalanced panel comprising 130 countries and 25 years 
 
 
 
Appendix II. Non-parametric and semiparametric estimations. Per capita GDP 
To check whether results change if GDP per capita is measured in levels rather than in 
logarithms, the non-parametric and semiparametric regressions of Figures 1, 2 and 4.b are run with per 
capita GDP as independent variable. The resulting paths, in Figures A1, A2 and A3 are similar to those 
of Figures 1, 2 and 4.b above. In particular, Figure A3 derives from the semiparametric estimation 
where per capita GDP is the non-parametric independent estimator and time and fixed effects are 
controlled for. Also in this case, the path reaches a minimum at an income level of about 2,000 US$. 
This confirms that results are robust to the logarithmic transformation of the variable of per capita 
GDP.  
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Figure A1. Emigration ratios and income  Figure A2. Emigration variations and income 
   
 
Note: Between-country variations, country sample averages. 
The sample is an unbalanced panel comprising 130 countries 
and 25 years. Non-parametric regression using Epanechnikov 
kernel, local mean smoothing.  
 Note: Emigration is measured as (Emigrant stockt – Emigrant 
stockt-5/Populationt-5).  Average variations over 5-year lags. 
The sample is an unbalanced panel comprising 130 countries 
and 25 years. Non-parametric regression using Epanechnikov 
kernel, local mean smoothing. 
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Figure A3.  Semiparametric estimation. Income levels 
 
Note: The sample is an unbalanced panel comprising 130 countries and 25 years. Predicted 
emigration from semiparametric estimations with pc GDP non parametric. Regressors are 
country and time fixed effects.
 
 
Appendix III. Simulations. 
Some interesting patterns emerge with the main development indicators computed at their 
average values in two different groups of countries: Sub-Saharan countries and middle-income 
economies. Values in Table A4 are the predictive margins deriving from to regression of column (4) 
(Table 1, computed at specific values of the covariates with significant coefficients in all 
specifications. In particular, in columns (1) and (2), education, population growth and passport power 
values are computed at their mean levels in Sub-Saharan Africa: School life expectancy and Population 
growth rates are, respectively, 7.6 years and 2,6 percent, Passport power is 30. With these values, the 
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predicted Emigrant stock/Population ratio is 0.033, which corresponds to less than half of the mean 
value of the ratio in the entire sample, which is 0.070. 14 
Income growth starting from levels below 1,400$US is associated with lower rates of 
emigration. At 1,400$US the correlation reaches a minimum. From that level, if income increases, for 
example from 1,400$US to 1,800$US (everything else constant), the predicted emigration rate before 
and after the change remains unchanged at 0.034 (columns 1 and 4 in Table A4). However, if at that 
constant income level of 1,400$US, expected education increases by one year, from 7.6 to 8.6, the 
emigration rate falls, in this case from 0.034 to 0.031. Moreover, if schooling increases by one year 
and the rate of population growth falls by one percentage point (with income constant at 1,400$) the 
emigration ratio further decreases to 0.026. The two bottom rows of Table A4 report the total number 
of emigrants from the average country at each predicted rate of emigration. With an increase of one 
year in education, the emigrant stock from the country decreases from 590,176 to 538,102. The average 
population in the Sub-Saharan country is 17,358,120. Since the area comprises 42 countries, one extra 
year of education is therefore correlated with almost 2,200,000 fewer emigrants moving across and 
from Sub-Saharan Africa. With an increase of one year in education and a reduction of one percentage 
point in the rate of population growth, the emigrant stock decreases by almost six million (5,832,328 
= 24,787,395 -18,955,067).  
Simulations concerning countries at middle levels of development (where the emigration-
income relationship becomes bell-shaped in Figures 4.e and 4.f) are in columns (6) to (10) of Table 
A4. There, education is computed at 11 and 12 years and population growth at 1.6 percent and 0.6 
percent. A first clear difference with less developed countries is the average emigration-population 
ratio, which is now 0.1 – much higher than in columns (1) to (5), regarding low-income countries – 
and well above the sample average of 0.070. In this scenario, with education computed at 11 years and 
                                                            
14 The mean emigration rate from the region in the dataset is 0.26. This lower rate may depend on factor values that have 
not been explicitly considered in the simulation and are therefore automatically computed ad their sample means. 
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population growth at 1.6 percent, an increase in income from 17,000$ to 22,000$ is associated with a 
decrease in the emigration ratio from 0.1 to 0.096 (columns 6 and 9 of Table A4). A reduction in 
population growth at 0.6 percent does not significantly change emigration. However, an increase in 
income to 22,000$ and a parallel increase in education, for example by one school year, the emigration 
rate increases to 0.98 (or, from 0.1, falls by a smaller amount). This correlation of higher emigration 
rates with higher education levels in countries at a more advanced stage of development takes the 
opposite sign of that regarding earlier stages, where more schooling is associated with less emigration. 
Hence, education facilitates emigration from middle-income economies. The average population size 
in middle-income economies, of 17,569,680 people, is not very dissimilar to that of Sub-Saharan 
Africa, but the rates of emigration and emigrant stocks from middle-income economies are higher. 
Afterwards, as Figure 5 shows, beyond middle-income levels, emigration rates decline again. An 
interpretation of these results is that development, which implies higher income, more education and 
slower demographics, in low-income countries makes moving abroad less of a necessity, while along 
certain range of middle-income levels it facilitates migration to rich economies and, at the same time, 
significantly increases job opportunities at home. When the second effect prevails, countries become 
net immigration magnets themselves. 
Table A4.- Simulations. Dependent variable: Emigrant stock/Population 
  Sub-Saharan Africa Medium development countries 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Per capita 
GDP 
1,400 1,400 1,400 1,800 1,800 17,000 17,000 17,000 22,000 22,000 
Expected 
years of 
schooling 
7.6 8.6 8.6 7.6 8.6 11 12 12 11 12 
Population 
growth 
rate 
2.6 2.6 1.6 2.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 0.6 1.6 0.6 
Emigrant 
stock/ 
Population 
0.034 0.031 0.026 0.034 0.026 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.096 0.098 
Emigrant 
stock 
average 
590,176 538,102 451,311 590,176 451,311 1,756,968 1,756,968 1,756,968 1,686,689 1,721,829 
Emigrant 
stock total 
24,787,395 22,600,272 18,955,067 24,787,395 18,955,067           
Note: Predictive margins from equation (2), column (4) in Table (1). Model VCE robust. All coefficient significant at 5%. Passport power is computed 
at 33 for Sub-Saharan Africa and at 70 for medium-developed countries. 
 
